Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining by Koskela, Erkki
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Discussion Papers
Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with
Wage Bargaining
Erkki Koskela
University of Helsinki, RUESG and HECER
and
Rune Stenbacka
Swedish School of Economics, RUESG and HECER
Discussion Paper No. 60
May 2005
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781, E-mail
info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No. 60
Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage
Bargaining*
Abstract
In this paper the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort and wage
formation is analysed under different relative timings for the determination of base wage
and profit sharing. We show that the optimal profit share, decided by firms, under
commitment exceeds that under flexibility. This holds true, because by committing itself
to a profit share the firm can induce wage moderation, which adds to the returns from
using the profit sharing instrument. If the profit share is negotiated it depends positively
on the relative bargaining power of trade unions and it has both effort-enhancing and
wage-moderating effects.
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I. Introduction
Profit sharing refers to performance-related remuneration mechanisms consisting
of a base wage plus a share of profits of firms. It is an empirically important phenomenon
in many OECD countries. The OECD Employment Outlook (1995) reports cross-country
evidence on profit sharing in OECD countries. Pendleton et. al (2001) present more
recent and detailed data on the large proportion of workplaces with financial employee
participation, in particular in the form of profit sharing schemes, in EU-countries. For
further detailed evidence regarding profit sharing we refer to DICE database collected by
CESifo, http://www.CESifo.de. As profit sharing schemes are nowadays commonly used,
it is important to study their implications.
Weitzman (1985, 1987) conjectured that profit sharing systems would both
dampen the business cycle fluctuations of employment and reduce equilibrium
unemployment. Holmlund (1991) formally explored the relationship between profit
sharing and equilibrium unemployment. He argued that profit sharing will reduce
(increase) equilibrium unemployment if and only if the elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital exceeds (falls short of) one, while it will have no effect on equilibrium
unemployment when the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is equal to
one. Layard and Nickell (1990) show a similar neutrality result in the case of a Cobb-
Douglas production function and efficient bargaining. In all these contributions the profit
sharing instrument is negotiated and assumed to have no incentive effect on the workers’
effort decisions. But this does not lie in conformity with empirical evidence according to
which profit sharing enhances effort provision and thereby productivity (see e.g.
Wadhwani and Wall (1990), Cahuc and Dormont (1997) and Booth and Frank (1999)).1
In this paper we first incorporate the productivity effect of profit sharing into our
model in an environment with firms facing revenue uncertainty by focusing on a
production technology with unit elasticity of substitution between employment and effort.
This combines and unifies elements from union bargaining and efficiency wage theories
so that we can explore the implications of profit sharing in a more realistic way, which
1 Furthermore, in many countries profit sharing is embedded in a legal setting, which requires the profit-
sharing schemes to be independent of the wage agreements (see, for example, Cahuc and Dormont (1997)
or Pendleton et al. (2001)).
2lies in conformity with empirics. Second, we analyse the following unexplored issue.
How does the time sequence between base wage formation and profit sharing impact on
both the negotiated wage and the optimal profit share and its determinants?
Section II presents the basic structure of the model and various time sequences for
the profit sharing decision. The determination of effort by employees and the
employment decision by firms are presented in section III, while section IV investigates
the determination of the compensation scheme under flexibility versus commitment in
terms of the profit sharing decision as well as the case where the profit share and the base
wage are negotiated simultaneously. Finally, we present a brief conclusion.
II.  Basic Framework
We consider a representative firm operating in an environment with revenue
uncertainty. In conformity with the efficiency wage hypothesis we assume that the output
depends not only on the number of workers employed, but also on the effort supplied by
each worker, i.e. productivity. By employing L  units of labour, each providing effort, a ,
the revenues accruing to the firm are given by
),()1( LaRq ,
where q  denotes a random revenue shock with a cumulative distribution function )(qF ,
and a density function )(qf , with the support [ ] +Í Rmaxmin ,qq . We assume that the
production function ),( LaR  satisfies the conventional properties:
0,0,0,0 <><> LLLaaa RRRR and .0>aLR
The profit share, t , determines what fraction of the firm’s profits is transferred to
employed workers as part of the contract. The firm unilaterally determines the
employment level and the employee the effort level once wages and profit sharing have
been determined. As the trade union is formed by homogenous agents and as intra-
organizational agency issues within the union are outside the scope of our analysis, the
union is assumed to be able to enforce the effort provision by the representative union
3member so as to eliminate the potential free rider problems.2 We summarise the various
alternative timing of decisions made by the firm, the union and the union members in
Figure 1.
 Stage 1         Stage 2         Stage 3                 Stage 4
            (I) Nw ft ),( aL q
(II) ct Nw ),( aL q
(III) Stage 1                               Stage 2                  Stage 3
               (i) ),( NNw t ),( aL q
                      (ii) ),( sNw t ),( aL q
Figure 1: Alternative time sequences of decisions in terms of employment L , effort a ,
profit share t , base wage Nw  and resolution of uncertainty .q
The timing structure (I) captures the idea that the negotiated base wage serve as a
commitment, which the firm takes as given when it makes its profit-maximizing profit-
sharing decision. Subsequent to the profit sharing decision, the firm unilaterally
determines employment and the union members effort provision. Finally, once all these
decisions are made, uncertainty is resolved. The timing structure (II) exchanges the
relative timing of the determination of profit sharing and wage negotiations. This timing
highlights a scenario where the firm commits to the profit share in anticipation of the
base wage. Finally, the timing structure (III) captures simultaneous determination of
profit shares and base wages. In order to compare the results we explore two versions of
this relative timing: simultaneous determination of profit shares and wages, where the
profit share is negotiated or where the firm sets it.
III. Labour Demand and Effort
The risk-neutral firm decides on employment L  so as to maximize the expected
profits
2 If we were to apply an alternative formulation where individual efforts were not directly observable and
workers were heterogenous, group punishment or reward schemes would have to be used for enforcement
(see e.g. Holmström (1982)). This is an important issue for further research.
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Conditional on the negotiated base wage and profit share the risk-neutral representative
employed union member makes the effort decision in order to maximize the expected
utility
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where the disutility of effort, )(ag , is an increasing ( 0)(' >ag ) and convex ( 0)('' >ag )
function of effort. The optimal employment and effort provision is determined by the
system of first-order conditions
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According to (4) the firm chooses the employment level so as to equalize the expected
marginal return from labour to the wage cost, while (5) characterizes the determination of
effort by a representative employee so as to equalize the expected marginal benefit from
effort to the marginal disutility of effort.
In order to make the comparison of results with the earlier literature more
transparent, we make the following two parametric specifications for the functional forms
of the production technology and the disutility of employee effort.
Assumption R: The technology is assumed to satisfy the concave production function
a
a)(),( LaLaR = with 10 << a .
Assumption G: The increasing and convex disutility of effort belongs to the class of iso-
elastic functions gg 1)( aag =  with .10 << g
5Under assumptions R and G the equilibrium condition (4) with respect to the
employment decision can be written as follows
1*)6( --= hhhq awL ,
where q  denotes the expected value of revenue shock and 1)1(1 >-= ah  is the direct
wage elasticity of labour demand. Labour demand depends negatively on the base wage
and positively on the effort of employee.
Analogously, by substituting assumption G into (5) we find that the optimal effort
is given by
[ ] 10,)7( * <<= gt gwa  .
Hence the optimal effort depends positively on the base wage as well as on profit sharing.
We can now summarize our characterization of the optimal combination of
employment and effort provision in
Proposition 1: Labour demand depends negatively on the base wage and positively on
the effort of employees, while effort by employees depends positively on the profit share
as well as on the base wage.
Equation (6) suggests that labour demand does not directly depend on profit sharing,
which lies in conformity with empirical evidence (see e.g. Wadwani and Wall (1990))
and Cahuc and Dormont (1997)). Profit sharing enhances productivity by stimulating
effort provision.3
3 Some aspects of the interactions between wage bargaining and efficiency wage considerations have been
previously analysed e.g. in Lindbeck and Snower (1991), Sanfey (1993) and Garino and Martin (2000). In
contrast to our analysis, in these papers the effort function was not derived from the employee’s objective
function.
6IV. Wage Bargaining with Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing
IV.1.    Base Wage and Profit Share Flexibility
We first analyse the timing structure (I) (see Figure 1), where the firm is flexible
by deciding on the profit share after the base wage negotiation. Hence at stage 2 the firm
decides on the profit share in order to maximize the expected net profit subject to (6) and
(7) and by taking the base wage as given according to
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It is shown in Appendix A that the optimal profit share, when it will be decided after
wage negotiation, is
(9) 1
)1(1
)1(0 <
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-
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gh
t f ,
where
a
a tg t= . Hence, profit sharing depends positively both on g  and on 1-h so that
we have
Proposition 2: Under flexible profit sharing the optimal profit share depends positively
on both the elasticity of effort with respect to profit sharing (g ) and the elasticity of
labour demand with respect to effort ( 1-h ).
At stage 1 the base wage is negotiated. We apply the Nash bargaining solution, according
to which employment and profit sharing are unilaterally determined by the firm, whereas
effort is provided subject to the discretion of employees. In line with (3), the objective
function of the trade union can be written as )()(ˆ agLbLNE
L
wLUE --+úû
ù
êë
é += pt ,
where the first term captures the benefits from employment to employed workers, the
7second term the benefits for unemployed union members and the last term denotes the
disutility of effort for employed union members. We assume that the threat points of the
union and the firm are NbEU o =  and ,0=oEp  respectively. The calculation of the
union’s expected rent captures the idea that all the N workers have incentives to seek
employment. Union members, who are left unemployed, have the outside option b. Thus
the rent of the union, EU, is calculated to be
.)(),(ˆ),()11( ****0** úû
ù
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é -+-=-== agLaE
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Applying the traditional Nash bargaining solution the negotiating parties decide
on w in order to solve
{ [ ] [ ] bb pt --=W 1
)(
)1()12( EEUMax
w
subject to the labour demand (6) and the effort determination (7), where b  and
b-1 describes the relative bargaining power of the union and the firm, respectively. The
Nash bargaining solution has to satisfy the following first-order condition
0)1()13( =-+
p
pbb
E
E
EU
UE ww
where the subscript w denotes the partial derivatives with respect to the wage rate. We
assume that the sufficient second-order condition for the Nash bargaining solution (13)
holds. The determinants of the negotiated base wage Nw can be expressed through the
implicit representation
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8where ghhh )1(*
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L
Lw w  denotes the total wage elasticity of labour demand,
which incorporates both the direct negative employment effect and the indirect positive
effect via effort provision. Hence profit sharing has two opposite effects on the negotiated
base wage: (i) it tends to induce wage moderation as part of the compensation is shifted
to the performance-related profit share and (ii) the effort-enhancing effects of profit
sharing will also increase the costs of effort provision and thereby increase the
“individual rationality” constraint of each union member, which will have a positive
effect on the wage rate, ceteris paribus. By substituting the optimal effort (7) into (14) the
Nash bargaining solution can be expressed in explicit form (see Appendix B) as follows
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The wage rate increases with the outside option and the bargaining power of the
union, and decreases as a function of the total wage elasticity of labour demand. Under
the assumption that the wage-moderating effect of profit sharing dominates relative to the
cost of effort provision, i.e. if 1)1( <- gh , we can now summarize our analysis in
Proposition 3: The negotiated wage is proportional to the outside option available to the
union, increasing in the bargaining power of the union, and decreasing in the total wage
elasticity of labour demand. Furthermore, profit sharing will moderate the negotiated
base wage if 1)1( <- gh .
The negotiated base wage equation (15) represents a generalization relative to the
traditional Nash bargaining solution.4
4   Our analysis associated with the Nash bargaining solution (15) simultaneously includes profit sharing
and efficiency wage considerations. Altenburg and Straub (1999), Bulkley and Myles (1996), Lindbeck
9IV.2.    Base Wage and Profit Share Commitment
Next we analyse the timing structure (II) (see Figure 1), where the firm commits
to the profit share prior to the base wage negotiation. When the firm commits to the profit
share, it means that equation (8) is maximized with respect to t  subject to labour demand
(6), effort determination (7) and the Nash bargaining solution for the base wage.  Using a
similar procedure as in Appendix A, the optimal profit share is found to be
(16)
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for the case when the firm commits itself to the profit share before the wage negotiation
(see also Koskela and Stenbacka (2004)).
Based on a straightforward comparison between (16) and (9) we can conclude that
fc tt > . This means that under commitment the optimal profit share is larger than that
associated with flexibility. Furthermore, under commitment the profit share is increasing
as a function of g , 1-h  and of the elasticity of base wage with respect to profit sharing
(- N
N
w
w tt  ).
This is summarized as
Proposition 4: The optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility.
Furthermore, the profit share under commitment is increasing as a function of the
elasticity of effort with respect to profit sharing (g ), of the elasticity of labour demand
with respect to effort ( 1-h ) and of the elasticity of base wage with respect to profit
sharing (- N
N
w
w tt ).
and Snower (1991) and Sanfey (1993) analyse related issues, but these models do not include profit
sharing as an incentive device.
10
Intuitively, under commitment profit sharing has a wage-moderating effect. This
effect adds to the returns from profit sharing. Thus, the optimal profit share under
commitment exceeds that associated with flexibility.
IV.3.    Base Wage and Profit Share Negotiation
Finally, we analyse the timing structure (III) (see Figure 1), where the profit share
and the base wage are determined simultaneously. We first study the negotiated profit
share (scheme III(i)) and configuration where the firms decides on the  profit share
simultaneously with the base wage negotiation (scheme III(ii)).
With simultaneous negotiation the parties decide on w andt in order to solve
{ [ ] [ ] bb
t
pt --=W 1
),(
)1()17( EEUMax
w
subject to the labour demand (6) and the effort determination (7). This gives a negotiated
base wage, which formally looks identical to (15). In terms of profit sharing we have the
following first-order condition
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Solution of equation (18) yields the following implicit representation of the negotiated
profit share
(19)
X
XN
bgh
bghb
t
--+
--+
=
)1(1
)1(     ,
11
where 1
1
1
1
1
10 <
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
--
+
=<
g
h
t
A
A
X  with
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-
-
+
-
+
=
g
h
t
h
b
1
11
1
1 *
A denoting the mark-up
whereby the base wage Nw exceeds the outside option b  (see Appendix C). From (19) we
can directly infer that the negotiated profit share is an increasing function of the union’s
bargaining power, i.e. .0>
¶
¶
b
t N  In particular, by allocating the bargaining power
completely to the firm or to the union we obtain the following two special cases
(20) 1
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From (20) we can observe that the profit share where the firm decides on the
profit share simultaneously with the wage negotiation, i.e. 0== btt
s , coincides with that
associated with flexible profit sharing when the firm decides about it after the base wage
negotiation. In other words, the relationship sf tt = holds. Moreover, the negotiated
profit share , Nt , is increasing as a function of the trade union’s bargaining power.
Furthernore, for each 10 << b  presence of the efficiency effect raises the negotiated
profit share (see (19) and (20)).
We can now summarize our analysis of the timing structure where the profit share
is determined simultaneously with the base wage negotiation.
Proposition 5: The Nash bargaining solution for profit sharing, when determined
simultaneously with the base wage, is increasing in the bargaining power of the union
and is higher in the presence of productivity effect when the union has some bargaining
power, i.e. .10 << b Further, when the firm decides on profit sharing simultaneously
with the wage bargaining, the optimal profit share is identical to the profit share under
flexibility.
12
V.  Brief Conclusion
This study has offered a new unified framework for analyzing the determination
of employment, the effort provided by employed union members, the wage, and profit
sharing when firms face uncertainty generated by a stochastic revenue shock. Our
analysis focused on the implications for the optimal profit share of the relative timing
structure of profit sharing and wage bargaining.
Most importantly, we demonstrated that the optimal profit share under
commitment exceeds that under flexibility. This holds true, because by committing to a
profit share the firm can induce wage moderation. This wage-moderating effect promotes
profit sharing as it adds to the returns from using the profit sharing instrument. Moreover,
when the firm decides on profit sharing simultaneously with the wage bargaining, the
optimal profit share is identical to the profit share under flexibility. Finally, if the profit
share is determined through Nash bargaining, the profit share is higher in the presence of
the productivity effect when the trade union has some bargaining power.
Appendix A: Derivation of the optimal profit share with flexibility
The first-order condition associated with the maximization of (8) with respect to t  and
subject to (6) and (7) (for given w ) is
(A1) 0)()1()(
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expressions we can rewrite (A1) as follows
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which gives (9). QED
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Appendix B: Derivation of the negotiated wage
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms
p
p
E
E w  and
EU
EUw in the first-order
condition (13) of the Nash bargaining. The optimal employment decision of the firm has
to satisfy the first-order condition ( ) .)1(0 1
h
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=Û= -  By taking this into
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Substituting (B1) and (B3) into equation (13) of the text yields (14) and (15). QED
Appendix C: Derivation of the negotiated profit share
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms
p
pt
E
E  and
EU
EUt  in the first-order
condition (18) associated with the Nash bargaining for profit sharing and solves it to
produce equation (19). We first find that
L
aLEE a tt pp =  so that by using the properties
of labour demand (6) and effort (7) equations we end up with
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Now we can re-express the first-order condition (18) as
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After some manipulation we end up with
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